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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-1869 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
FRANCIS APONTE, 
 
                Appellant  
_____________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 2-12-cr-00501-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 22, 2015 
_____________ 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
(Opinion Filed:  February 19, 2015) 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Francis Aponte appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a 
firearm by convicted felon on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct.  Aponte also argues 
that the District Court committed plain error by sentencing him under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm.   
I. BACKGROUND 
On June 17, 2012, Philadelphia police officers Christopher Sarris and Todd Lewis 
(the “Officers”), members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) unit, heard 
gunshots while on patrol.  The Officers immediately observed Aponte firing a handgun in 
the air while another man stood next to him watching.  The Officers approached the two 
men, retrieved the handgun, and arrested Aponte. 
A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Aponte with one count of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  At 
trial, the jury found Aponte guilty of the charged offense; he was subsequently sentenced 
to 240 months’ imprisonment.  This timely appeal followed.       
II. ANALYSIS1 
a. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
“[N]on-contemporaneous objections are reviewed for plain error.”  United States 
v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 193 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 
182 (3d Cir. 2003)).  “For reversible plain error to exist, there must be (1) an error; (2) 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) which seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Tai, 750 
F.3d 309, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 
(1997)).  “[W]e may reverse only if we find an error in the prosecutor’s comments so 
serious as to ‘undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a 
miscarriage of justice.’”  United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1126 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985)).  As Aponte concedes, he did not 
make a contemporaneous objection.  Accordingly, we will review for plain error. 
Aponte argues that his conviction should be vacated because the government made 
improper statements during its closing argument.  Specifically, Aponte contends that the 
government committed misconduct by: (1) appealing to the jury’s passion by invoking 
the possibility of a shoot-out and injury to Aponte, the police, or bystanders;2 and (2) 
vouching for the Officers’ credibility.3  After reviewing the entirety of the government’s 
closing statement, we find Aponte’s arguments lack merit.  
At trial, Aponte’s counsel argued that the Officers did not see Aponte in 
                                              
2 Such statements included, inter alia, that Aponte owed “a debt of gratitude [to the 
Officers] . . . because of the remarkable professionalism and restraint” that the Officers 
exhibited.  The government added that “[e]very breath that this Defendant has taken up to 
this moment has been a direct result of that professionalism and extraordinary restraint by 
those Officers.”  App. 199.      
3 Among other things, Aponte objects to the government’s description of the 
Officers as being “highly trained” and having exercised “extraordinary restraint” and 
“remarkable professionalism” throughout the encounter with Aponte.  App. 199.  Aponte 
also objects to the government’s statement that the “Officers got it right and [] followed 
their procedures,” and took Aponte “into custody in conformance with the protocols of 
the Philadelphia Police Department.”  Id. 202–03.   
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possession of the firearm and failed to conduct a proper investigation to identify the 
actual shooter.  Further, his counsel claimed that the Officers arrested him on the basis of 
his prior criminal history.  As a result, the Officers’ credibility, training, and adherence to 
protocol were relevant issues.  The government’s closing argument addressed these issues 
in a manner consistent with, and supported by, the evidence introduced at trial.  Further, 
there is no basis to conclude that any of the government’s statements undermined the 
fundamental fairness of the trial.  Thus, there was no plain error and Aponte is not 
entitled to a new trial.4   
b. Sentencing 
Aponte next argues that the District Court committed plain error by sentencing 
him under § 924(e)(1) of the ACCA.5  Aponte did not object to this issue at sentencing; 
we will accordingly only review for plain error.6  See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
                                              
4 Aponte also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional.  Aponte 
acknowledges that this argument is foreclosed by Third Circuit precedent, see United 
States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001) and United States v. Shambry, 392 F.3d 
631 (3d Cir. 2004).  These issues are raised for preservation purposes only.   
5 That subsection requires a sentence of a minimum of fifteen years of 
imprisonment for individuals found to have violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) who have “three 
previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both . . . .”  
Aponte also argues that an enhanced sentence under the ACCA violates his Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Alleyne 
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).  Aponte acknowledges that this argument is 
foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 
U.S. 224 (1998), and raises it here for the purpose of preservation only.   
6 At sentencing, Aponte did not dispute the fact of his conviction, but only its use 
in determining his sentence: 
THE COURT: He’s not disputing the fact of the conviction, just its use in – 
MR. STOSIC: Yes, Your Honor. 
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725, 731–32 (1993).  Here, the presentence report (“PSR”) included three prior 
convictions that potentially qualified as predicate offenses under the ACCA: two drug 
offenses and one robbery conviction.  “Aponte does not dispute that the two drug 
offenses qualify as ACCA predicates.  Nor does he dispute that a robbery would qualify 
as an ACCA predicate, if proven.”  Appellant Br. 30 (footnote omitted).  Instead, Aponte 
argues that the District Court committed plain error by relying on the PSR as the only 
evidence of the robbery conviction.   
Aponte makes no attempt on appeal to establish that the District Court committed 
plain error by relying on the robbery conviction in the PSR.  As noted, the District Court 
inquired into this issue at sentencing and was assured by Aponte’s counsel that there was 
no dispute as to the underlying conviction.  Moreover, Aponte does not contend on 
appeal that he was not convicted of the 1996 robbery.  Lastly, Aponte offers no other 
basis upon which to conclude that the District Court improperly relied on the PSR as 
evidence of the robbery conviction.  Accordingly, we reject Aponte’s claim of error.    
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction. 
                                                                                                                                                  
THE COURT: – determining his sentence? 
MR. STOSIC: Yes, Your Honor.  
App. 327.  The government argues that in light of Aponte’s concession at sentencing, he 
has waived his right to pursue this claim.  However, we will assume, arguendo, that 
Aponte did not waive this claim.  
